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This paper presents a unifying theory of permission that integrates the concept of
negative permission with three concepts of positive permission, namely explicit permission,
exemption and antithetic permission. The concepts are deﬁned and logically related by
paying particular attention to the system of which they form part. A simple procedure for
calculating the permitted actions that can be said to be implicit in a code of norms or a
policy speciﬁcation is then given.
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1. Introduction
The concept, or rather concepts, of permission is a topic of much debate in the theory of normative systems and the
philosophy of law.1 It is also, for reasons I shall have more to say about shortly, potentially of crucial importance for
information management in open distributed systems, where the need for principled ways of specifying allowable uses of
information is increasing—rapidly. There are several problems related to permission, but from a logico-philosophical point
of view they can all be lumped together into the question: What is the common denominator of all permitted actions, and
how does it connect the many facets of the concept of permission?
It is generally agreed that there are two main categories of permission, although there is no consensus yet on how they
are related. The ﬁrst, usually called negative permission, is fairly simple: An action is negatively permitted by a code if and
only if it is not prohibited by that code. This is nonetheless a very important concept that ﬁgures prominently in law. In
criminal law, it is known as the principle nullum crimen sine lege—there is no crime where there is no law—where it admits of
a number of interpretations depending, among other things, on whether it is applied to the legislature or to the adjudicating
authorities. In the latter case it expresses the presumption of the innocence of the defendant, that is, it coincides with the
principle in dubio pro reo stating that whenever there is doubt, one should rule in favour of the accused. When the principle
is applied to the legislature, on the other hand, it says that the existence of a crime depends on there being a previous
legal provision declaring the action to be a penal offense.2 In societies in which new regulations are continually enacted the
general assumption that the non-existence of a prohibitive rule gives rise to a permission is an important one to defend [10].
The proliferation of novel technology, the emergence of multi-culturalism, professionalisation of areas of expertise, etc. all
push new legislation into existence. Not to infringe on people’s freedom, therefore, it is important to acknowledge that
where there is no law there is leeway, rather than, say, to rule by the spirit of law.
The concept of positive permission, on the other hand, is more elusive. As a ﬁrst approximation one may say that some-
thing is positively permitted if and only if a code explicitly presents it as such [21, p. 391]. According to Norwegian law, for
instance, if a temporary representation of a work that is ordinarily protected by intellectual property rights is essential to a
process whose sole purpose is to facilitate the legitimate use of the work, then it is permitted to make copies of it. This is
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1 See e.g. [4,5,7–10,16,17,23–26,32,33,35].
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As well as the actions that a code explicitly pronounces to be permitted, there are others that in some sense follow from
the explicit ones. The problem is to clarify the inference from one to the other [21].
In computer science the concept of permission has ﬁgured prominently in theoretical research for many years—although
often under different names such as privilege or access right.3 The need for a rigorous deﬁnition of the concept arose in
connection with the problem of how to design systems that would prevent information from “escaping” beyond appropriate
boundaries, usually by storing information in a set of ﬁles associated with an access policy formulated in terms of roles and
privileges.4
Not disputing the obvious merits of this line of research, Weitzner et al. argue in a recent paper [36] that the access
control paradigm is not very well equipped to handle the rapidly evolving Web-based information ecosystem as we now
know it. Due to the proliferation of personal information on the Web and the increasing analytical power available to large
institutions through Web search engines and other facilities, access control over a single instance of personal data, they
argue, is insuﬃcient to guarantee the protection of privacy when either the same information is publicly available elsewhere
or it is possible to infer it with a high degree of accuracy from other information that is itself public [36, p. 84]. In response,
Weitzner et al. propose to shift the emphasis from data protection onto information accountability, understood as the design
of architectures that make the use of information transparent and traceable. Rather than to hide it from view—which is
increasingly diﬃcult anyway—we should aim to make it possible to determine whether a particular use of information is
appropriate under a given set of rules, and hence to determine when individuals and institutions can be held accountable
for misuse, so the argument goes. Information accountability, one might say, is a take on information management that,
unlike the effort to ensure compliance through access control, is modelled on the actual relation between the law and its
subjects [36, p. 86].
In the abstract at least, this idea makes good sense. As the information economy grows more complex and organic, the
boundary between the ‘digital’ and the ‘analog’ world is being erased. There is in general no clean separation between an
electronic market, say, and the rest of society. An action taken in a digital environment may have ramiﬁcations within the
environment itself—usually in terms of the availability of information and services—or outside of it, in terms of judicial
liabilities, contractual obligations and so forth. But, when the virtual and the real fuses, the protection of liberties becomes
partly an algorithmic problem, and that forces us to think through the concepts involved more rigorously than we would
otherwise have to.
Weitzner et al. list three architectural features that an accountable information infrastructure would need to have: It
would need to have a policy aware transaction log that records the information pertinent to the assessment of accountability.
It would also need to have a policy language against which compliance is checked, and ﬁnally it would have to provide
policy-reasoning tools to assist users in answering such questions as: Is this data allowed to be used for a given purpose? But
clearly, if we want computers to answer such questions, then we need adequate methods for calculating the permissions
that can reasonably be said to be implied by the policy. This problem cries out for a principled solution.
In what follows, the phrase “positive permission” will be used as a collective term covering both explicitly declared
permission and anything that must be reckoned permitted by implication from what has thus been explicitly stated (by
some as yet unspeciﬁed notion of implicature). I shall distinguish between two kinds of implied positive permission, namely
exemption and antithetic permission. An action of the former kind may tentatively be characterised as one which is exempted
from a covering prohibition by a permissive provision. Stated differently, an exemption is an action that (vagueness intended)
falls under a provision that has been declared by law to constitute an exception to a general prohibition. Consider the
following example from the Norwegian police act §11: “It is forbidden for participants in any public arrangement to wear
a mask, unless participating in a play or masquerade or the like” (my emphasis). We may infer that it is permitted to wear
a mask during a public performance of, say, The Tempest, since The Tempest is indeed a play. In other words, if you are an
actor in a public performance of The Tempest then you’re exempted from the prohibition against wearing a mask in public.
The second form of implied permission, may be called antithetic permission, since such a permission (the thesis) overrules
any prohibition (the antithesis) that is incompatible with it. Unlike exemption, the primary function of antithetic permissions
is not to limit or suspend an existing prohibition, but rather to prevent one from being passed or practiced in the ﬁrst
place. As a ﬁrst attempt, we may say that an action is antithetically permitted if it cannot be prohibited by a code without
making that code contradict an explicit or implicit permission which is already in force. The paradigm example—but by
no means the only one—is an action protected by constitutional law. Freedom of expression, for instance, is recognised as
a human right under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is recognised in international human
rights law in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Although it is not absolute—limitations may follow
the “harm principle” or the “offense principle”, for example in the case of public nudity or “hate speech”—it is a provision
that guarantees certain rights to people, in the sense that it pre-empts any conceivable prohibition against those rights. An
example that comes to mind is the Jyllands-Posten incident of 2005, when Muslim organisations ﬁled a complaint with the
Danish police, following the publication of twelve cartoons depicting the Islamic prophet Mohammad. The investigation was
discontinued by the Regional Prosecutor in Viborg, who concluded that Jyllands-Posten must be reckoned protected by the
3 See e.g. [22,29–31].
4 See e.g. [1,2,12,27].
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of the cartoons was deemed antithetically permitted by the Danish authorities.
Taking stock, positively permitted is anything that is either (i) explicitly declared to be so, or (ii) permitted by implication
from something that falls under (i) and that may (exemption) or may not (antithetic permission) constitute an exception to
an already existing general prohibition. Clearly, these concepts are quite closely related.
The aim of the present paper is to exhibit the logical interrelations between these variants of positive permission as well
as the logical interrelations between positive and negative permission. I shall do so in a way that heeds the slogan “no logic
of norms without attention to the system of which they form part”, that is, permissive norms will be analysed in the larger
context of a system. Finally, by way of illustration of the utility of the framework, I give a simple procedure for calculating
the positive permission that can be said to be implicit in a code or policy speciﬁcation.
2. An informal analysis of permissive structures
An explicitly granted permission would be completely idle were it not set out against a backdrop of prohibitions, because
telling me what I am permitted to do does not in any way alter the range of choices open to me if nothing is denied me
anyway. The point may be stated in terms of reasons: When some authority issues a directive, that authority purports to
give its subjects a reason to act accordingly. The extent to which it actually does so, one might say, reﬂects the extent
to which its claim to authority is accepted. Thus the statement “according to institution s, b is mandatory given a”, can,
if the authority of s is presumed unchallenged, be understood as “s has given you a reason to do b given a”. An explicit
permission, on the other hand, is a declaration to the effect that you have no (institutional) reason not to do b given a,
or stated differently; it is a legislative act whereby you are released from an obligation or (by pre-emption) shielded from
the imposition of one. In other words, a permission has no positive regulatory content, meaning that it does not require
that something be done. It only serves to inform you what you are not under a duty to do, which, of course, is entirely
superﬂuous if there is no duty. In other words, permission is essentially a negative concept.
This is not a novel insight, of course, but has been stressed time and again by philosophers of law and logicians alike.5
Nevertheless, a look at the sources strongly indicates that the implications of this simple observation have not been fully
appreciated. Its signiﬁcance consists in the fact that the purpose of a positive permission can only be to restrict the scope and
inﬂuence of an already existing prohibition or to pre-empt one that could possibly be passed. Declaring an action permitted
does not add to the requirements imposed on people by a mandatory norm. From a logical point of view, therefore, positive
permission is essentially derogation: A positive permission suspends, annuls or obstructs a covering prohibition, thereby
generating a corresponding set of liberties.
In what I shall consider the principal case of positive permission, an implied positive permission suspends a general
prohibition that is already in force—it is, one might say, an exemption from an operative ban. Consider the following example
from §8 of the Norwegian personal information act:
§8. Personal information may only be processed by the consent of the registered person, or if processing is statutorily
warranted, or such processing is required in order to
(a) honour an agreement with the registered person, or to perform a task that accords with the registered person’s
wishes before such an agreement was entered into,
(b) fulﬁl a legal obligation on the part of the person responsible for handling the information,
(c) attend to the registered person’s vital interests,
(d) perform a task in the interest of the general public,
(e) exercise public authority, or
(f) attend to a justiﬁable interest that is not outweighed by the regard for the registered person’s right to privacy.
As indicated by the word “only” in the opening sentence, accessing someone’s personal information is in general prohibited.
The statute then goes on to list a set of particular cases for which the prohibition is pronounced null or void. These cases
are in effect exempted from the ban, and therefore constitute permissions.
Alf Ross, for one, was very clear on this (although, as I shall argue later, he failed to draw the right conclusions): “Norms
of permission have the normative function only of indicating, within some system, what are the exceptions from the norms
of obligation of the system” [26, p. 120]. The Norwegian education act §2–4 provides another example: “Christian teachings
and ethical education is an ordinary school subject that shall normally be attended by all pupils”. The relevant sense of
normality is speciﬁed by the attendant clause: “On the basis of written notiﬁcation from parents, pupils shall be exempted
from attending those parts of the teaching at the individual school that they on the basis of their own religion or philosophy
of life, perceive as being the practice of another religion or adherence to another philosophy of life”. Here the mandatory
norm is formulated as a duty, but nothing of importance turns on that since requiring attendance is the same as prohibiting
absence.
5 See for instance [5,24,26,34,35].
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exemptions. This structure bears instructive similarities to closed world databases, although the parallel should not be over-
burdened: Just as a closed world database operates under the assumption that what is not currently known to be true is
false, a permissive structure operates under the presumption that what is not positively permitted is prohibited. In a closed
world database everything is assumed to be false, as far as that is compatible with the information that is explicitly stated
in the database. If information to the contrary is available, however, the presumption of falsity yields. A permissive struc-
ture relates prohibitions and exemptions in the same way. In the personal information act, the general prohibition against
processing personal information works logically like a closed-world assumption. If a case is not listed as an exemption (or
implied by one), then it isn’t.
The interesting thing to note here is that the presumption of falsity in both cases establishes a priority relation between
two sources of information; a default assumption, on the one hand, and explicitly stated information on the other. If the
explicitly given information is incompatible with the default assumption, then the latter is suspended. This may all seem
obvious, and is certainly well-known from database theory. Nevertheless, this simple priority structure seems often to be
lost out of sight when it comes to the concept of permission. As it is a conditio sine qua non for an adequate theory, it is
important to understand its signiﬁcance, and to keep it ﬁxed in view.
Now, the same priority relationship in turn holds between negatively permitted actions and mandatory ones. The princi-
ple of negative permission, we recall, states that whatever is not prohibited by a code is permitted according to that code. It
follows that if an action is prohibited, then it is not negatively permitted. In other words prohibitions assume priority over
negative permissions, and negative permissions always yield to the greater force of a mandatory norm. Assembling all the
parts of this emerging picture, we can illustrate a permissive structure as follows:
A few explanatory remarks are perhaps in order: A normative problem may be regarded as a question concerning the
deontic status of actions. In the majority of cases, the act referred to in a norm is the production of a certain effect or
change. Since there are inﬁnitely many ways to specify the effect of an action, and inﬁnitely many ways of bringing it
about, the universe of actions must be assumed to be inﬁnite. It follows that no norm rules out all freedom of choice,
although one may say, following Alf Ross, that according to how precisely the action is speciﬁed, the norm is more or less
rigorous or discretionary. Returning to the illustration, the outermost box must thus be understood as comprising an inﬁnite
set of actions. Now, the function of the principle of negative permission is to cover this entire set thereby closing the set of
prohibitions and duties, that is, nothing is obligatory if it is not stated to be so. The set of mandatory actions in turn closes
the set of explicitly permitted ones, that is, nothing is positively permitted if it is not stated to be so. Hence the relationship
between the three classes of actions may tentatively be illustrated by a three-level nesting of boxes where the closure of
the respective domains goes from the outermost to the innermost box, whereas the order of priority6 goes in the converse
direction.7 We can read off from this diagram a list of desiderata that any theory of permission should meet. Such a theory
should:
1. Do justice to the negative character of explicit permission by casting them as exemptions,
2. Recognise the distinctness of explicit from negative permission,
3. Show that a permissive structure is a unit where
(a) explicitly permitted actions are given priority over mandatory actions, and
(b) mandatory actions are given priority over negatively permitted ones.
I shall use these desiderata as methodological guidelines in what follows.
6 This priority ordering, it should be stressed, is only valid within a permissive structure consisting of a mandatory norm and its particular exemptions.
It is certainly not the case that permissive provisions always take priority over obligating norms. As was remarked by one of the referees, one may also
ﬁnd that general permissions have exemptions: A law may e.g. permit public demonstrations in general, but state that they are forbidden if some of the
people carry weapons, say, or damage property.
7 Note that antithetic permissions do not ﬁgure in this picture. An antithetic permission will turn out to be either a negative permission or a positive
permission and there is no simple way to represent the determining factor graphically. However, we shall see that once the structure above has been given
an adequate formal expression, a deﬁnition of antithetic permission naturally suggests itself.
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The reader should be warned that the term “positive permission” is not quite apt, since positive permissions comprise
exemptions and antithetic permissions. That is, the set of positive permissions includes cases for which a prohibition is
deemed inapplicable—that is, absent. In a sense therefore, both negative and positive permissions can be negative insofar
as they may arise in the wake of a prohibition. I shall nevertheless continue to talk about positive permission, since this
terminology is already established, but the reader should bear the negative character of this concept in mind. Its signiﬁcance
lies in the fact that positive permissions, as well as negative permissions, are systemic or holistic properties. In general there
are as many ways to permit an action as there are ways of blocking or reducing the consequences of a set of mandatory
norms. This means that permissions, negative or positive, are most naturally evaluated against the total output of a code.
A permission is not a separate modality or norm-character, it is a way of constraining a set of decrees—an operation on a
code. Particularly when it comes to permissions therefore, it seems wise to heed the warning no logic of norms without
attention to a system of which they form part [17, p. 29].
Just as the theoretical paradigm of a theory is a logically closed set of sentences (i.e. a set of sentences closed under
entailment), the theoretical paradigm of a normative system may be taken to be a set of mandatory norms that contains
all norms it entails (by some as yet unspeciﬁed notion of entailment). This is abstract, true, but will do well for purposes
of conceptual analysis. One of the few such accounts on offer is the theory of input/output logic as set out in a series of
papers by Makinson and van der Torre [18–20]. Input/output logic is deliberately designed to serve as an abstract model of
normative systems, and I shall take it as my idiom of choice in the following.
In input/output logic a norm is simply a pair (a,b) correlating an applicability condition, trigger or input a with a duty,
optimality condition or output b. I shall sometimes denote them neutrally as the antecedent and consequent of a norm
respectively. For the purposes of the present paper the base language in which the antecedent and consequent of a norm
are formulated is just propositional logic, but this is not a requirement. The base language needs to be closed under the
boolean connectives, but may in addition contain other constructs, such as for instance deontic modalities. Hence, the b in
(a,b) could very well be a normative proposition containing an ought or must. However, the choice of base language is of
no consequence for the developments that follow, so long as it is a boolean language, so simplicity favours propositional
logic.
A norm in the present paper therefore contains only declarative sentences. Accordingly, we think of the antecedent as
a description of the states of affairs to which the norm applies, and of the consequent as a description of a state of affairs
that is considered mandatory whenever the antecedent is satisﬁed. I shall distinguish between mandatory norms, on the
one hand, and the obligations or requirements they impose on the other. Norms have applicability conditions, requirements
do not. Stated differently, requirements are the consequents of mandatory norms. In general, I shall use the term “norm” as
a generic term for all relevant pairs (a,b) of formulae ﬁguring in a system either as mandates or permissions. Thus, there
will be permissive norms as well as mandatory ones.8
To be sure any really adequate representation of norms, requires much more than this. It needs to represent human,
agency, the passage of time, bearers and counterparties of obligations and so on. Nevertheless, it seems wise to reserve
more complex machinery until we have obtained a clear picture of the abstract structure, and until we have conﬁrmed that
the essential ideas are sound.
Note that a norm (a,b) in input/output logic is construed as a logically arbitrary stipulation connecting an input a with
an output b—it is logically arbitrary in the sense that a pair is not a formula, so there is nothing to the norm (a,b) over and
above the fact that some authority requires that b be done given a. One could see this as an expression of a kind of anti-
naturalism, or conventionalism, wrt to norms. The validity of a norm (a,b) need not have any ontological or epistemological
status beyond that of being decreed to hold. As Kelsen says: “Norms posited by human acts of will are arbitrary in the
genuine signication of the word: that is, they can decree any behaviour whatsoever to be obligatory” [15, p. 4]. Notably, the
pair as such has no logic, the contrapositive of a norm is not necessarily a norm, nor is any pair of the form (a,a). Hence,
norms do not behave as material conditionals, and they do not satisfy the reﬂexivity property. This is important insofar
as reﬂexivity would collapse the distinction between the actual and the ideal, making every fact optimal according to the
norms.
A code of norms in input/output logic is simply a set G of such pairs, from whence it follows that the explicitly declared
requirements, in any situation a (or alternatively, on any input a) according to G , can be obtained by taking the image of a
under G . The basic notion of normative implicature in turn allows implicit norms to be derived from the explicit ones—i.e.
from the ones contained in G—e.g. by recognising that which implies (logically) the trigger of a norm as itself a trigger
of a norm, and that which follows (logically) from an explicitly declared requirement as itself mandated by a norm. To be
more precise, the basic model of a normative system is an operation out of type 2L
2 × 2L → 2L (where L is the language of
propositional logic) deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.1. out(G,a) = Cn(G(Cn(a))), where Cn(a) is the closure under logical entailment of the formula a.
8 There is ample precedence in the literature for such a generic use of the term “norm”: Hart [14] for instance speaks of power-conferring norms, whereas
Raz [25] and Alchourron and Bulygin [5] distinguish, as I do, between permissive and mandatory norms.
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It is not to create or determine a distinguished set of norms, but rather to prepare information before it goes in as input
to such a set G , to unpack output as it emerges and, if needed, coordinate the two in certain ways. A set G of conditional
norms is thus seen as a transformation device, and the task of logic is to act as its “secretarial assistant” [20, p. 2].
However, a syntactic representation of the out-operator, can be given by deﬁning (a,b) ∈ out(G) iff b ∈ out(G,a).9 This
projection of the out-operation onto its left argument, although it can be regarded merely as a stylistic variant, entails a
change of gestalt: We are now construing out as an operator mapping relations to relations, whence a normative system
becomes a relation that is the value of (the monadic) out for some argument G . As it turns out, this latter relation, taking G
as given, may be represented by the system that contains the following axioms
Tautology: (t, t) for arbitrary tautologies, t ,
Inclusion: (a,b) for (a,b) ∈ G ,
and the following rules of inference:
Input strengthening (SI): From (a,b) to (c,b) whenever c  a.
Output weakening (WO): From (a,b) to (a, c) whenever b  c.
Conjunctive conclusions (AND): From (a,b) and (a, c) to (a,b ∧ c).
In other words membership in out(G) corresponds to derivability from G , where derivability is understood in terms of
membership in the least superset of G that contains (t, t) and is closed under AND, SI and WO. In [18] the latter set is
denoted deriv(G). Observation 1 of the same paper then shows that out(G) = deriv(G). Note that these operators are closure
operators. That is, they satisfy
Idempotence: out(out(G)) = out(G),
Inclusion: G ⊆ out(G), and
Monotony: out(G) ⊆ out(G ′) whenever G ⊆ G ′ .
I shall have occasion to appeal to these later.
By modifying Deﬁnition 3.1 in certain ways, other operators can be deﬁned that satisfy more rules, such as cumulative
transitivity, that are certainly interesting candidate principles for reasoning with norms. However, Deﬁnition 3.1 will do ﬁne
for the purposes of this paper (i.e. introducing additional principles would not change anything), so I refer the reader to the
sources.
Henceforth, I shall work with the monadic version of the out operator (Deﬁnition 3.1 is still important by way of intuitive
motivation, though). The remainder of this section records a few properties that will be important for the subsequent
developments:
Lemma 3.2 (Easy half of conditionalisation). If (a ∧ c,b → d) ∈ out(G) then (c,d) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,b)}) whenever c  a.
Proof. Suppose that c  a and (a ∧ c,b → d) ∈ out(G). Then (c,b → d) ∈ out(G) by SI. Moreover (c,b) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,b)}),
again by SI, so (c,d) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,b)}), by AND. 
Lemma 3.3 (Hard half of conditionalisation). If (c,d) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,b)}) then (a ∧ c,b → d) ∈ out(G).
Proof. Argument proceeds by induction on the length of a derivation. For the basis of the induction suppose ﬁrst that
(c,d) = (t, t). Since we have (t ∧ a,¬b ∨ t) = (t ∧ a,b → t) ∈ out(G) for any a and b, by input strengthening and output
weakening, we are done. Next, suppose (c,d) ∈ G . Then (c,b → d) ∈ out(G) by output weakening, and (a∧c,b → d) ∈ out(G)
by input strengthening. For the induction step, suppose the property holds for shorter proofs, and
1. Suppose that (c,d) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,b)}) and that (c,d) is derivable from (g,h) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,b)}) by SI. Then c  g and
d = h. Since (g,h) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,b)}), it follows by the induction hypothesis that (a∧ g,b → h) ∈ out(G). Since c  g we
thus have (a ∧ c,b → h) ∈ out(G), by SI, and since d = h we have (a ∧ c,b → d) ∈ out(G) as desired.
2. Suppose that (c,d) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,b)}) and that (c,d) is derivable from (g,h) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,b)}) by WO. Then g = c and
h  d. Since (g,h) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,b)}), it follows by the induction hypothesis that (a∧ g,b → h) ∈ out(G). Since g = c we
thus have (a ∧ c,b → h) ∈ out(G), and since h  d we have (a ∧ c,b → d) ∈ out(G), by WO as desired.
3. Suppose that (c,d) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,b)}) and that (c,d) is derivable from (g,h), (g′,h′) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,b)}) by AND. Then
c = g = g′ and d = h ∧ h′ . By the induction hypothesis we have that (a ∧ g,b → h), (a ∧ g′,b → h′) ∈ out(G), whence
9 Overloading the terminology a bit, I shall refer to both the dyadic and the monadic out-operator, as simply an out-operator.
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desired.
This completes the proof. 
Thus, we have the following simple corollary:
Corollary 3.4. If c  a then (c,d) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,b)}) iff (a ∧ c,b → d) ∈ out(G).
Given the equality out(G) = deriv(G), this corollary is analogous to the deduction theorem for classical logic, in the sense
that it establishes a link between derivability and material implication. The differences should be obvious though; special
care is required wrt applicability conditions.
4. Positive permission according to Makinson and van der Torre
The desiderata listed in Section 2 rule out most accounts of permission on offer. Ross is on the right track when he says
“I know of no permissive legal rule which is not logically an exemption modifying some prohibition”, but then he continues
“and interpretable as the negation of a prohibition” [26, p. 122]. Of course explicit permission is interpretable as the negation
of an obligation/prohibition insofar as what a permissive provision does is to render a prohibition null and void for a
particular case. It is not thereby to be identiﬁed, as Ross seems to think, with a negative permission, however, because their
respective positions in the priority ordering differ (cf. the illustration): Permissive provisions override mandatory norms,
and are therefore to a certain extent protected—in cases of conﬂict the permission prevails. Negative permissions, on the
other hand, are overridden by mandatory norms and are therefore exposed—in cases of conﬂict the permission yields. In
other words the negation of an obligation is not necessarily the same as a negative permission as the latter concept is here
understood. Ross takes the negative character of explicit permission as evidence that the two can be identiﬁed, and his
account consequently violates desideratum 2.
An inventory and evaluation of existing approaches is outside the scope of this thesis. One account that is of particular
interest here, however, is that of [21], since it takes the same general point of view as that adopted here—that is, of
treating positive permission holistically as a systemic property. It is also the ﬁrst analysis of permission in an input/output
idiom, and many of its central insights have inﬂuenced the present paper.10 I shall argue, however, that it too violates the
aforementioned desiderata.
A few notational conventions ﬁrst: Since we wish to analyse permissions in the larger context of a system, the proper
unit of analysis is a code 〈G, P 〉 consisting of a set of explicitly statedmandatory norms G and a set of explicitly stated permissive
norms P . I shall sometimes, for brevity, refer to P simply as the set of explicit permissions, although, strictly speaking, it
is a set of permissive norms. In the general case where (a,b) is an implied norm, I shall say that it is a mandatory or a
permissive, norm (as the case may be) according to or in such a code, in which case it means that b is required or permitted,
respectively, by that code whenever a is true. Reformulated accordingly, Makinson and van der Torre’s concept of negative
permission becomes:
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Negative permission). (a,b) is negatively permitted according to 〈G, P 〉 iff (a,¬b) /∈ out(G).
The interpretation of this deﬁnition is straightforward: G is the set of mandatory norms, so b is negatively permitted
given a iff it is not prohibited under the same condition. Note that the set of explicit permissions P does not come into
play. In other words the negatively permitted actions are taken to be those for which a contrary prohibition is absent,
not counting exemptions. Note also that negative permission so construed trivially satisﬁes desideratum 3b, that is, it gives
priority to prohibitive norms over negatively permitted actions, since (a,¬b) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}) for any G , so a negative
permission (a,b) always yields to (a,¬b) were the latter to be added to the code.
As regards the concept of antithetic permission (aka dynamic positive permission), Makinson and van der Torre’s deﬁnition
translates:
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Dynamic positive permission). (a,b) is a dynamic positive permission according to 〈G, P 〉 iff (c,¬d) ∈ out(G ∪
{(a,¬b)}) for some positively permitted (c,d) in the same code.
I shall postpone a detailed discussion of this concept until later. Suﬃce it to say that I am not going to change it very
much, since the general idea seems sound enough. In Makinson and van der Torre’s words the idea is to see (a,b) as
permitted whenever, given the obligations already present in G , we can’t forbid b under the condition a, without thereby
committing ourselves to forbid, under a condition c, something d that is implicit in what has been explicitly permitted
10 To my knowledge, there is only one other study of permission in input/output logic so far, and that is [32].
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of positive permission that is appealed to here, and since I shall plug in a different concept of positive permission than
Makinson and van der Torre, I’d rather return to it then. The concept they intend is one they call static positive permission:
Deﬁnition 4.3 (Static positive permission). (a,b) is a static positive permission according to 〈G, P 〉 iff (a,b) ∈ out(G ∪ {(c,d)})
for some (c,d) ∈ P .
As the observant reader will have noticed, Deﬁnition 4.3 has the effect of including all norms in out(G) among the static
positive permissions, implementing the principle that ought entails may. The idea behind the deﬁnition is to treat (a,b) as
permitted iff there is some explicitly given permission (c,d) such that when we join it with the obligations in G and apply
the output operation to the union, then we get (a,b) among the consequences [21, p. 397]. Static positive permissions are
thus treated like weak obligations, the basic difference being that while obligations proper may be used jointly, permissions
may only be applied one by one. This restriction is intended to capture the fact that two actions may be permitted under a
common condition without being jointly so. For instance, whereas it is usually the case that drinking is permitted and that
driving is permitted according to the same legal system, it is usually not the case that drinking and driving is permitted, so
permissions cannot in general be conjoined.
Although this restriction to singleton applications of explicit permissions causes the operation of deriving a static positive
permission from one or more static positive permissions to differ from an ordinary input/output operation such as out (the
reader is referred to the cited paper for details), there is clearly an intimate relationship between them. Makinson and van
der Torre are able to establish the following connection: Every rule of inference, such as e.g. AND, that is satisﬁed by an
input/output operation (in this paper we consider only one; the operation out given by Deﬁnition 3.1) is an instance of the
general Horn form
HR:
(a1,b1), . . . , (an,bn)
(g,h)
c  d
where c and d may be tautologies (again in the case of AND). Now, for any given input/output operation, satisfaction of such
a Horn rule is reﬂected by a derivation rule for positively permitted norms that takes the form of a subverse rule: Label each
norm (a,b) either (a,b)o or (a,b)p , depending on whether (a,b) is in out(G) or (a,b) is positively permitted according to
Deﬁnition 4.3. Then the subverse of a Horn rule is:
HR↓: (a1,b1)
o, . . . , (an−1,bn−1)o (an,bn)p
(g,h)p
c  d
In other words, the subverse rule is obtained by downgrading to permission status one of the premises and also the conclu-





Thus, even though two distinct permissions need not be jointly permitted, the conjunction of a positive permission and
an obligation always is, since all input/output operations satisfy AND (this is only meant as an example, not a criticism).










Now, return to the example from the Norwegian personal information act: Let (t,¬p)o stand for “processing of personal
information is prohibited” and (c, p)p for “processing of personal information is permitted if the registered person gives his







(c, p ∧ ¬p)p
(c,q)p
So if the registered person agrees to let anyone access his information, then everything is permitted! Clearly something
goes wrong here, and it is not too diﬃcult to see what it is. The problem is that the concept of static positive permission
does not establish a relation of priority between a permissive norm and the general prohibition to which it relates. Positive
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application of the deﬁnition should make this even clearer: Put G := {(t,¬p)} and P := {(c, p)}. Then, obviously (c, p∧¬p) ∈
out(G∪{(c, p)}) by SI and AND. In other words (c, p) is not treated as an exemption, but just as another norm. But according
to desideratum 3b that’s wrong—(c, p) is an exemption and should take priority. In a footnote Makinson and van der Torre
comment: “We do not consider here the contractions or revisions that one might wish to make to the code when A [that
is, the set of norms] is inconsistent with some z ∈ Z [that is, the set of permissions]. This is a separate matter, and forms
part of the logic of normative change” [21, p. 415]. But that, I am convinced, is plainly false. A positive permission is, in the
principal case, an exemption, and exemptions always conﬂict with a background prohibition—that’s the whole point. More
generally, if a permissive provision does not conﬂict with a directive that is or could possibly be passed, then it simply has
no purpose—there is nothing for it to do. In other words, the contractions or revisions that one might wish to make to
the code when a mandatory norm conﬂicts with a permissive norm is decidedly not a separate matter. Indeed permissive
norms simply are a kind of speciﬁcation saying how this is to be done.
5. Permission as derogation
Summing up so far, I have argued that any theory of positive permission should take the negative character of the
concept as fundamental. The purpose of a positive permission can only be to restrict the scope and inﬂuence of an already
existing prohibition or to pre-empt one that could possibly be passed. In the former case the prohibition acts as an exception
to a general prohibition that is already in force. In the latter case it serves as a shield against prohibitive laws that could
conceivably be passed. Notwithstanding the (as yet unclariﬁed) differences, if either kind of permission is to have a point, a
prohibition must be assumed. Thus, it is the purpose of a positive permission to act as a constraint on valid or applicable
law, and to suspend a lower-ranking prohibition in cases where that prohibition contradicts the permissive provision.
This informal analysis suggests that one way of looking at positive permission is in terms of derogation, where “deroga-
tion” is used as a term of art to denote the elimination (temporary or not) of a norm from a normative system. In other
words, derogation is taken to be the norm-theoretic analogue of contraction, and the working hypothesis is that the concept
of positive permission can be fruitfully analysed in terms of it.
In classical revision theory, a contraction on a set is carried out by intersecting maximally non-implying subsets, aka
remainders. That is, to remove an element a from a theory A one considers subsets of A that are such that they do
not entail a whereas all proper supersets do. The outcome of the operation is then taken to be that which all selected
remainders agree on. This has proved to be a robust and sustainable mathematical idiom, and I see no reason to deviate
from it. Hence:
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Remainders). out(G) ⊥ (a,b) is the set of H such that
1. H ⊆ out(G),
2. (a,b) /∈ out(H), and
3. If H ⊂ I ⊆ G then (a,b) ∈ out(I).
Note that we are taking remainders of the closure out(G) rather than of the base G , so we are aiming for a version
of theory contraction rather than, in the terminology of [13], base-contraction. Generalising the analysis to base-contraction
should be straightforward, once a skeleton theory is in place.
An important property of remainders, as so deﬁned, is that they are closed under the out-operation:
Lemma 5.2. If G = out(G) and (a,b) ∈ G, then H = out(H) for every subset H of G which is maximally such that (a,b) /∈ out(H).
Proof. By inclusion for out (recall that out is a closure operator), it suﬃces to show that (c,d) ∈ H whenever (c,d) ∈ out(H).
Suppose therefore that (c,d) ∈ out(H). By monotony for out we have that out(H) ⊆ out(G), hence (c,d) ∈ G using the
supposition that G = out(G). Now, suppose for reductio ad absurdum that (c,d) /∈ H . Then by the maximality of H and
the fact that (c,d) ∈ G we know that (a,b) ∈ out(H ∪ {(c,d)}). But since (c,d) ∈ out(H), by assumption, we have that
out(H) = out(H ∪ {(c,d)}) so that (a,b) ∈ out(H), contrary to hypothesis. 
Let, for the time being, the derogation operation be deﬁned by the full meet of the remainder set:
Deﬁnition 5.3. out(G) − (a,b) :=⋂(out(G) ⊥ (a,b)).11
Full meet contraction on sets of formulae is known to be a bit too heavy-handed, as it discards an unnecessarily large
amount of information. It is reasonable to expect—one should at least anticipate the possibility—that some of these problems
11 It is important not to confuse the derogation operation out(G) − (a,b) with set-theoretic difference. I shall use a backslash to denote the latter, as in
out(G) \ (a,b).
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better.12 For the sake of conceptual clarity, however, I have chosen to keep the framework as simple as possible, and to
leave the appropriate generalisations for later. It should be said, though, that some of the properties established in what
follows depend on the underlying derogation operator’s being a full meet operator. These properties would thus have to
be enforced by a condition on the selection function in a partial meet framework. It would be an interesting exercise to
formulate these conditions and to see what they have to say about the structure of a normative system, but I leave this for
future research. For the time being I shall be content to wave a hand wherever I ﬁnd that appropriate and illuminating.
Full meet derogation satisﬁes the following properties (they should look familiar to anyone coming from revision theory):
Lemma 5.4. Full meet derogation satisﬁes:
Closure: out(G) − (a,b) = out(out(G) − (a,b)).
Vacuity: out(G) ⊆ out(G) − (a,b) whenever (a,b) /∈ out(G).
Failure: If  b then out(G) ⊆ out(G) − (a,b).
Inclusion: out(G) − (a,b) ⊆ out(G).
Success: If (a,b) ∈ out(G) and  b then (a,b) /∈ out(G) − (a,b).
Local Recovery: If (a,b) ∈ out(G) then (a,b) ∈ out((out(G) − (a, c)) ∪ {(a, c)}).
Proof. Closure is an easy consequence of Lemma 5.2. Vacuity, Inclusion, Failure and Success all follow immediately from
Deﬁnitions 5.1 and 5.3. For local recovery, suppose that (a,b) ∈ out(G). We want to show that (a,b) ∈ out((out(G)− (a, c))∪
{(a, c)}). By AND it suﬃces to show that (a, c → b) ∈ out(G) − (a, c). Note that (a, c → b) ∈ out(G), by WO, since (a,b) ∈
out(G). Suppose for reductio ad absurdum that (a, c → b) /∈ H for some H ∈ out(G) ⊥ (a, c). Then by the maximality of H it
follows that (a, c) ∈ out(H ∪ {(a, c → b)}), so Lemma 3.3 yields (a, (c → b) → c) ∈ H . Now,
(c → b) → c  ¬(c → b) ∨ c
 ¬(¬c ∨ b) ∨ c
 (c ∧ ¬b) ∨ c
 c
Hence (a, c) ∈ H , by Lemma 5.2, and one application of WO, contradicting H ∈ out(G) ⊥ (a, c). 
The reader should be aware that the framework of theory contraction generates certain anomalies when applied to sets
of norms. That is, using theory contraction, rather than base-contraction has disadvantages when what is discussed are not
theories or beliefs but normative systems. For instance, if G = (t,a∧b) and P = (t,b) then (t,a) is still in out(G)−(t,b). This
result is often counterintuitive. For instance, ﬁlling in and returning a tax-form is not an obligation that can be partially
satisﬁed by complying with one of the conjuncts only. Rather, these actions are, we may say, deontically interdependent;
there is no point in ﬁlling in a tax form if you do not return it, and there is no point in returning a blank form. Deontic
interdependence, if we agree to call it that, is usually what the law giver of a conjunctive obligation has in mind. Otherwise
the conjuncts would have been separated before including the norms. Base-contraction (I shall assume familiarity with the
general idea) has the advantage that it respects these differences in the formulation of a code. In particular, (t,a) will not
linger after (t,a∧ b) has been removed from the base G .13 I shall leave further exploration of this point for future research.
Returning now to the concept of positive permission, recall that exemptions are essentially exemptions from something.
That is, an exemption always relates to a background prohibition. Antithetic permissions, on the other hand, for instance
constitutional guarantees, are derived from explicit permissions that do not relate to any prohibition in particular, but are
meant to reject in advance certain prohibitions that could conceivably be passed. In both cases though, the permission
acts as a constraint on valid or applicable law, so it is the mechanism of constraining that plays centre stage. The basic
difference is that in the case of antithetic permissions, no prohibition contradicting the pronounced permission yet exists,
so the constraint is idle. Hence it seems natural to treat exemption as the principal concept of positive permission, and to
proceed from there to an analysis of antithetic permission. A ﬁrst shot at a deﬁnition might be:
Deﬁnition 5.5 (Exemptions I). (a,b) is an exemption according to a code 〈G, P 〉 iff (a,¬b) ∈ out(G)\out(G)− (c,¬d) for some
(c,d) ∈ P .
I shall say that (a,b) is an exemption by the explicit permission (c,d). Exemptions are thus cast as cut-backs on the code
required to respect the explicit permissions in P . More precisely (a,b) is an exemption if the code contains a prohibition
that regulates the state of affairs a by prohibiting b, and (a,¬b) is such that, unless it is removed, the code will contradict
an explicit permission in P .
12 A complete characterisation of partial meet derogation on input/output systems can be found in [28].
13 This was pointed out to me by one of the referees. A related point is discussed in [28, chap. 5].
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exemption by itself:
Lemma 5.6. If (a,¬b) ∈ out(G) \ out(G) − (c,¬d) for some (c,d) ∈ P then (c,¬d) ∈ out(G) \ out(G) − (c,¬d).
Proof. Since out(G) out(G) − (c,¬d), it follows that ¬d, by Failure. Moreover, Vacuity gives us (c,¬d) ∈ out(G), for the
same reason. Therefore (c,¬d) ∈ out(G) \ out(G) − (c,¬d), by Success. 
Note also, that if (c,¬d) /∈ out(G), i.e. if (c,¬d) is not a norm that is derivable in the system, then out(G) − (c,¬d) will
be identical to out(G), by Vacuity and Inclusion so out(G) \ out(G) − (c,¬d) will be empty. Therefore, unless an explicit
permission is in direct conﬂict with a norm derivable in the code, the permission will not be an exemption from any
norm in the code. This is intentional and indicates (by exclusion) the kind of case in which an explicit permission will be
considered as a preemption, or a protection or a shield, against effective direct or indirect introduction of a certain potential
mandatory (i.e. prohibitive) norm, rather than as an exemption from an existing norm.14
To see how Deﬁnition 5.5 behaves, consider the following example:
Example 5.7. Put G := {(t,¬p)} and P := {(c, p)}. Think of these norms as a general prohibition against processing personal
information and as an exception for express consent respectively. We have (c,¬p) ∈ out(G) by input strengthening. By
success for full meet derogation, however, (c,¬p) /∈ out(G) − (c,¬p), so (c, p) constitutes an exemption.
Exemptions, so deﬁned, satisfy several interesting properties, for instance:
Lemma 5.8 (Output weakening). If (a,b) is an exemption in 〈G, P 〉 then so is (a, c), given that (a,¬c) ∈ out(G) and b  c.
Proof. Suppose that (a,b) is an exemption in 〈G, P 〉 and that b  c. From the former assumption we have that (a,¬b) ∈
out(G) \ out(G) − (g,¬h) for some (g,h) ∈ P . Assume now that (a,¬c) ∈ out(G). It suﬃces to show that (a,¬c) /∈ out(G) −
(g,¬h). Suppose for reductio ad absurdum that (a,¬c) ∈ out(G) − (g,¬h). We have b  c by assumption, whence ¬c  ¬b
by contraposition. It follows that (a,¬b) ∈ out(G) − (g,¬h), by Closure for full meet derogation and one application of WO.
But by assumption (a,b) is an exemption, so (a,¬b) /∈ out(G) − (g,¬h)—a contradiction. 
Thus if it is permitted to process some item of personal information on a given condition, and we assume that processing
entails access, then accessing the information is allowed. An easy consequence of output weakening is the following property
of disjunctive exemption:
Lemma 5.9 (Disjunctive exemption). If (a,b) and (a, c) are exemptions according to 〈G, P 〉 then (a,b ∨ c) is an exemption according
to the same code.
Proof. Suppose (a,b) and (a, c) are both exemptions according to 〈G, P 〉. Then (a,¬b), (a,¬c) ∈ out(G), so (a,¬b ∧ ¬c) ∈
out(G), by AND, and (a,¬(b ∨ c)) by WO. Thus, since b  b ∨ c, it follows by Lemma 5.8 that (a,b ∨ c) is an exemption in
〈G, P 〉. 
Both these properties seem relatively intuitive and desirable. Much more problematic is the property of input weakening:
Lemma 5.10 (Input weakening). If (a,b) is an exemption according to 〈G, P 〉 then (c,b) is an exemption according to the same code
whenever (c,¬b) ∈ out(G) and a  c.
Proof. Suppose (a,b) is an exemption in 〈G, P 〉. Then (a,¬b) ∈ out(G) \ out(G) − (g,¬h) for some (g,h) ∈ P . Suppose
further that (c,¬b) ∈ out(G) and that a  c. It suﬃces to show that (c,¬b) /∈ out(G) − (g,¬h). Suppose to the contrary
that (c,¬b) ∈ out(G) − (g,¬h). Then by Closure for full meet derogation we have that (a,¬b) ∈ out(G) − (g,¬h), by one
application of SI. This contradicts the assumption that (a,b) is an exemption, so the proof is complete. 
The property of input weakening for conditional permission is brieﬂy discussed in [17], where the following example is
offered by way of motivation: “Given that it is permitted to mow the lawn on Sunday between 10h00 and 12h00, I may
conclude that it is permitted to do so on Sunday, but I may not conclude from the latter that it is permitted to mow on
Sunday afternoon”. However, a look at more realistic examples quickly reveals that this is not a valid pattern of reasoning.
Consider this time the personal information act §9c:
14 I owe this particular formulation to one of the referees.
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(c) processing is required in order to attend to the registered persons’ vital interests, and the registered person is unable
to consent.
If we accept input weakening, then we may conclude that processing is permitted if the registered person is simply unable
to consent. Thus, shooting him is one way of obtaining permission to access his information. The following regimented
example brings out the problem more clearly:
Example 5.11. Put G := {(t,¬p)} and P := {(c, p)}, where we interpret the norms as in preceding examples. Then (c, p) is an
exemption according to 〈G, P 〉, and, by input weakening, so is (t, p). Hence, given that processing of personal information
is permitted on some condition, then it is permitted unconditionally.
Imagine an information infrastructure such as that envisioned by Weitzner et al., where the system assumes responsi-
bility for answering queries such as “am I allowed to use this information?”. Obviously, input weakening would constitute
a serious systemic anomaly, as it would make the system answer ‘yes’ in all circumstances, given that any condition allows
the information to be used. I conclude that input weakening is not a desirable property. Nor is input strengthening, actually,
since a permission may be toggled on and off under increasingly speciﬁc circumstances. Norwegian intellectual property
law (LOV-2006-12-22-103) provides one example. §2 states a general restriction on the production of copies: “Intellectual
property gives exclusive rights to produce copies, temporary or permanent”. An exception is recognised in §11a: “If a tem-
porary representation of a work is essential to a process whose sole purpose is to facilitate the legitimate use of the work
then §2 is suspended”. The statute then goes on to state an exception in turn to this exception: “this provision does not
apply to computer programs and databases”. Hence, a permission to produce a copy of a piece of intellectual property may
be toggled off again when more is known about the circumstances and the nature of the work.15 This strongly suggests
that permissive norms should be regarded as classical with respect to the antecedent, in the terminology of [11]. The deﬁnition
should therefore be modiﬁed as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.12 (Exemptions II). (a,b) is an exemption according to the code 〈G, P 〉 iff (a,¬b) ∈ out(G) \ out(G) − (c,¬d) for
some (c,d) ∈ P such that c ≡ a.
This deﬁnition satisﬁes neither input weakening nor strengthening. I’ll show the failure of the former only:
Example 5.13. Let G := {(t,¬p)} and P := {(c, p)}. Then (c,¬p) ∈ out(G) by SI, but (c,¬p) /∈ out(G)−(c,¬p) by the property
of success for derogation, so (c, p) is an exemption according to 〈G, P 〉. However, there is no (t,q) ∈ P for any q, so the
condition (t,¬p) ∈ out(G) \ out(G) − (t,q) fails for all q. Hence (t, p) is not an exemption according to 〈G, P 〉 so input
weakening fails.
I shall take Deﬁnition 5.12 as my “oﬃcial” deﬁnition. As can be seen, conditional permission, although classical with
respect to the antecedent, is nevertheless normal with respect to the consequent, and thus still satisﬁes output weakening
and disjunctive exemption. Moreover, it should be clear that the deﬁnition conforms to our desiderata. The permission that
acts as a constraint is itself immune to derogation, and therefore always assumes priority over prohibitions.
Finally, it can be shown that the set of exemptions is closed under exemptions, i.e. that Deﬁnition 5.12 is a deﬁnitional
schema that can be used iteratively in the following sense16:
Lemma 5.14. (a,b) is an exemption in 〈G, P 〉 whenever (a,¬b) ∈ out(G) \ out(G)− (c,¬d) for some exemption (c,d) in 〈G, P 〉 with
a ≡ c.
Proof. Suppose (a,¬b) ∈ out(G) \ out(G) − (c,¬d) for a ≡ c. Then, there is an F ∈ out(G) ⊥ (c,¬d) such that (a,¬b) /∈ F .
It follows, by the maximality of F that (c,¬d) ∈ out(F ∪ {(a,¬b)}), whence (a ∧ c,¬b → ¬d) ∈ F ⊆ out(G), by Lemma 3.3.
Now, (c,d) is an exemption in 〈G, P 〉, by assumption, so there is a pair (g,h) ∈ P with g ≡ c such that (c,¬d) /∈ out(G) \
15 A natural extension to the system presented here would thus be to allow exceptions to permissive norms as well. One idea that suggests itself is to
give the notion of a code a recursive structure. For instance: A code is either a pair 〈G, P 〉 or it is pair 〈G,C〉 where G is a set of mandatory norms, and C
is a code. All references to P in the deﬁnitions presented in this section would then be replaced by C . I have not yet looked into this though, and do not
really know if it would work.
16 This possibility was suggested by one of the referees.




(a ∧ c,¬b → ¬d)
(a,¬b → ¬d) SI
(c ∧ g,¬d → ¬h)
(a,¬d → ¬h)
WO
(a, (¬b → ¬d) ∧ (¬d → ¬h))
(a,¬b → ¬h)
So (a,¬b → ¬h) ∈ out(G), by the equality out(G) = deriv(G). Now, to prove that (a,¬b) ∈ out(G) \ out(G) − (g,¬h), it
suﬃces to ﬁnd an H ∈ out(G) ⊥ (g,¬h) such that (a,¬b) /∈ H . Consider the set H− := {(a,¬b → ¬h)}. Clearly (g,¬h) /∈
out(H−), unless  ¬b which, by Success, must be false since (a,¬b) /∈ out(G) − (c,¬d). Hence H− can be extended to
a maximal subset H of out(G) such that (g,¬h) /∈ H . Moreover (a,¬b) /∈ H , by AND, since (a,¬b → ¬h) is. Therefore
(a,¬b) /∈ out(G) − (g,¬h), since the derogation operator is full meet. It follows that (a,b) is an exemption in 〈G, P 〉 as
desired. 
Now, having the set of exemptions under reasonable control we are now in position to say something substantial about
antithetic permission. Recall that the idea, as put in words by Makinson and van der Torre (who in turn give Alchourron
credit for it), is to see (a,b) as permitted whenever, given the mandatory norms in G , we can’t forbid b under the condition
a without thereby committing ourselves to forbid, under a condition c that could possibly be fulﬁlled, something d which
is implicit in what has been explicitly permitted. Now, that which a code explicitly pronounces to be permitted are just the
elements in P , and exemptions are permissions implicit in P . Hence antithetic permission becomes:
Deﬁnition 5.15 (Antithetic permission). (a,b) is antithetically permitted according to 〈G, P 〉 iff (c,¬d) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)})
where (c,d) is an exemption or an explicit permission according to the same code, and a ≡ c.
This is a straightforward translation, with minor modiﬁcations, of the deﬁnition of dynamic positive permission from
[21], the differences being two: Firstly, we are now plugging in a different concept of positive permission. Secondly, in order
to avoid the problems that ensue from input weakening, antithetic permissions are required to be classical only with respect
to the antecedent. The next theorem gives another representation that will come in handy later:
Theorem 5.16. (a,b) is antithetically permitted in 〈G, P 〉 iff (a,¬b → ¬d) ∈ out(G) where (c,d) is an exemption or an explicit
permission in the same code such that a ≡ c.
Proof. From left to right, suppose (a,b) is antithetically permitted according to 〈G, P 〉. Then (c,¬d) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}) for
some exemption or explicit permission (c,d). It follows by Lemma 3.3 that (a ∧ c,¬b → ¬d) ∈ out(G), whence, since a ≡ c,
(a,¬b → ¬d) ∈ out(G), by SI. For the converse direction, suppose (a,¬b → ¬d) ∈ out(G), and that (c,d) is such that a ≡ c.
Then by AND and SI we have (c,¬d) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}), so we are done. 
The next example gives a simple illustration of the behaviour of this concept:
Example 5.17. Put G := {(a,d → b)} and P := {(a,d)}. Then (a,b) is antithetically permitted since (a,¬b → ¬d) ∈ out(G) and
(a,d) ∈ P . However, (a,b) is not an exemption, since (a,¬b) /∈ out(G).
As the example shows, antithetic permission does not coincide with exemption, but there is obviously a quite close
relationship between them. The next theorem brings this relationship out clearly:
Theorem 5.18. If (a,b) is antithetically permitted in 〈G, P 〉, then it is an exemption in 〈G ∪ {(a,¬b)}, P 〉.
Proof. Suppose (a,b) is antithetically permitted in 〈G, P 〉. Then, by Theorem 5.16, (a,¬b → ¬d) ∈ out(G) for a permissive
norm (c,d) in 〈G, P 〉 with a ≡ c. By the deﬁnition of antithetic permission (c,d) is either an exemption or an explicit
permission. The argument thus splits into cases:
If (c,d) is an exemption in 〈G, P 〉, then we have that (c,¬d) ∈ out(G) \ out(G) − (g,¬h) for some (g,h) ∈ P with g ≡ c.
It follows that (c,¬d) /∈ H for some H ∈ out(G) ⊥ (g,¬h), whence (g,¬h) ∈ out(H ∪ {(c,¬d)}) by the maximality of H .
Therefore (c ∧ g,¬d → ¬h) ∈ H ⊆ out(G), by Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 5.2, whence (a,¬d → ¬h) ∈ H ⊆ out(G), by SI and
a ≡ c ≡ g . Since both (a,¬b → ¬d), (a,¬d → ¬h) ∈ out(G), therefore, we have (a,¬b → ¬h) ∈ out(G) by AND and WO.
Now, to show that (a,b) is an exemption in 〈G ∪ {(a,¬b)}, P 〉 it suﬃces to show that (a,¬b) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}) and that
(a,¬b) /∈ out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}) − (g,¬h). The former follows immediately from the fact that out is a closure operator. For the
latter it suﬃces to ﬁnd an H ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}) ⊥ (g,¬h) such that (a,¬b) /∈ H . But the existence of such a set follows
immediately from the fact that (a,¬b → ¬h) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}), for we may expand {(a,¬b → ¬h)} to a maximal subset
H of out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}) such that (g,¬h) /∈ H , in which case (a,¬b) /∈ H , by construction of H , AND and g ≡ a.
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{(a,¬b)})− (c,¬d), the former of which is immediate. The argument for the latter is essentially a rerun of the argument for
the existence of an appropriate maximal subset of out(G ∪{(a,¬b)}) from above: We have (a,¬b → ¬d) ∈ out(G ∪{(a,¬b)})
by Theorem 5.16 and monotony for out. By reasoning similar to that above, the set {(a,¬b → ¬d)} can be extended to a
maximal subset F of out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}) such that (c,¬d) /∈ F . Clearly (a,¬b) is not in F so we are done. 
Despite its simple appearance, this is a non-trivial property that depends crucially on the underlying derogation operation
being a full meet operation, for we need to establish the existence of a remainder in which the added element (a,¬b) is
not included. Were we to take a partial meet operation as basic then the property would not in general hold. An interesting
exercise would then be to investigate the conditions under which it would be valid. Although I shall leave that question
for future research, it is clear that an answer would consist in formulating the conditions under which the added element
(a,¬b) is to be given a lower priority than certain elements already present in the code, thus seeing to it that a remainder
not having (a,¬b) would be chosen by the selection function. Clearly therefore, the property above would say something
substantial about the priority structure of the given code. I shall leave all this aside for the moment. Let me just say that I
regard it as a virtue of the theory developed here, that such questions become clearly visible.
The converse of Theorem 5.18 holds on any derogation operation:
Theorem 5.19. If (a,b) is an exemption in 〈G ∪ {(a,¬b)}, P 〉 then it is antithetically permitted in 〈G, P 〉.
Proof. (a,b) is an exemption in 〈G ∪ {(a,¬b)}, P 〉 if (a,¬b) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}) \ out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}) − (a,¬d) for some
(a,d) ∈ P . It thus suﬃces to show that (a,¬b → ¬d) ∈ out(G) by Theorem 5.16. By Local Recovery we have (a,¬d) ∈
out((out(G) − (a,¬b)) ∪ {(a,¬b)}), whence (a,¬b → ¬d) ∈ out(G) − (a,¬b) ⊆ out(G) by Inclusion for full meet deroga-
tion. 
Antithetic permissions are thus precisely the pairs that would constitute exemptions if the code were expanded with a
covering prohibition. This agrees well with intuition I think, and also ﬁnds support in the sources:
This is what happens with constitutional rights and guarantees: the constitution rejects in advance certain norm-contents
(that would affect basic rights), preventing the legislature from promulgating this norm-content, for if the legislature
promulgates such a norm-content, it can be declared unconstitutional by the courts and will not be added to the system
[4, pp. 397–398].
Theorems 5.18 and 5.19 spell out, with welcome precision, what it means for a permissive provision, such as e.g. a consti-
tutional guarantee, to reject a norm in advance, as Alchourron and Bulygin puts it. Another way to say the same is that a
permissive provision in a merely antithetic use represents a commitment not to allow a code to grow in certain speciﬁed
ways. Indeed, the ‘checked growth’-perspective is an equivalent way of looking at things:
Theorem 5.20. (a,b) is antithetically permitted in 〈G, P 〉 iff (a,¬b) /∈ out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}) − (c,¬d) for some (c,d) ∈ P with a ≡ c.
Proof. For the left-to-right direction, if (a,b) is antithetically permitted according to 〈G, P 〉, then it is an exemption in
〈G ∪ {(a,¬b)}, P 〉, by Theorem 5.18, whence (a,¬b) /∈ out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}) − (c,¬d) for some (c,d) ∈ P with a ≡ c, as desired.
For the converse direction suppose (a,¬b) /∈ out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}) − (c,¬d) for some (c,d) ∈ P with c ≡ d. If (c,¬d) /∈ out(G ∪
{(a,¬b)}), then out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}) − (c,¬d) = out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}), by Vacuity for full meet derogation, contradicting (a,¬b) /∈
out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}) − (c,¬d). Hence (c,¬d) ∈ out(G ∪ {(a,¬b)}), so (a,¬b → ¬d) ∈ out(G) by Lemma 3.3 and SI and the
assumption that a ≡ c. Hence (a,b) is antithetically permitted according to 〈G, P 〉, which is what we wished to show. 
As regards entailment relationships, Example 5.17 shows that antithetic permissions need not be exemptions, but the
converse direction holds:
Theorem 5.21. Exemptions are antithetically permitted.
Proof. Suppose (a,¬b) ∈ out(G) \ out(G) − (a,¬d) for some (c,d) ∈ P with a ≡ c. Then there is an H ∈ out(G) ⊥ (c,¬d)
such that (a,¬b) /∈ H . Since (a,¬b) ∈ out(G), it follows by the maximality of H that (c,¬d) ∈ out(H ∪ {(a,¬b)}), whence
(a,¬b → ¬d) ∈ H ⊆ out(G), by Lemma 3.3, SI and the assumption that a ≡ c. Therefore, (a,b) is antithetically permitted by
Theorem 5.16. 
Similarly:
Theorem 5.22. Explicit permissions are antithetically permitted.
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by Theorem 5.16. 
Moreover, exemptions are precisely the antithetically permitted norms whose local negation—where (a,¬b) is the local
negation of (a,b)—is in the given code out(G):
Theorem 5.23. If (a,b) is antithetically permitted according to 〈G, P 〉 and (a,¬b) ∈ out(G) then (a,b) is an exemption in 〈G, P 〉.
Proof. Since (a,b) is antithetically permitted in 〈G, P 〉 it is an exemption in 〈G ∪ {(a,¬b)}, P 〉 by Theorem 5.18. Since by
assumption (a,¬b) ∈ out(G) we have 〈G ∪ {(a,¬b)}, P 〉 = 〈G, P 〉, so we are done. 
These theorems taken together go a long way, I think, towards clarifying the exact relationship between explicit permis-
sion (items in P ), exemptions and antithetic permission (the three species of positive permission). To complete the picture
we need to bring negative permission back into it. Note ﬁrst that the set of negatively permitted actions and the set of
exemptions are disjoint:
Theorem 5.24. If (a,b) is negatively permitted then it is not an exemption.
Proof. If (a,b) is negatively permitted, then (a,¬b) /∈ out(G), so (a,b) is not an exemption. 
This is as it should be, since it allows us to distinguish sharply between, on the one hand, those actions that a legislature
or other norm-issuing authority can prohibit at its discretion, and, on the other hand, those actions that may require the
prior retraction of an intentionally granted permission. That is, the disjointness of these two classes of action is necessary to
preserve the priority ordering as described in Section 2. Antithetic permissions, on the other hand, can clearly be negatively
permitted, since their local negations need not be derivable from the code:
Theorem 5.25. If (a,b) is antithetically permitted according to 〈G, P 〉, but not an exemption according to the same code, then it is
negatively permitted.
Proof. Suppose (a,b) is antithetically permitted in 〈G, P 〉, but not an exemption. We need to establish that (a,¬b) /∈ out(G).
Theorem 5.18 tells us that (a,b) is an exemption in 〈G ∪ {(a,¬b)}, P 〉. Thus if (a,¬b) ∈ out(G) then 〈G ∪ {(a,¬b)}, P 〉 =
〈G, P 〉, so (a,b) is an exemption in 〈G, P 〉 contrary to assumption. 
Before bringing this paper to a close we should return to the problem of how to compute the permissions that can
be said to be implicit in a code or policy speciﬁcation. This problem was brieﬂy discussed in the introduction, and we
are now in position to give it a tentative solution: By deﬁnition, (a,b) is antithetically permitted in 〈G, P 〉 only if (a,¬b)
contradicts an explicit permission or an exemption in the same code. It is possible to eliminate the latter disjunct and to
show that (a,¬b) must ultimately contradict an explicit permission in P . The proof relies on the representation of antithetic
permission given by Theorem 5.16:
Theorem 5.26. If (a,¬b → ¬d) ∈ out(G) for some exemption (c,d) with a ≡ c, then (a,¬b → ¬h) ∈ out(G) for some explicit
permission (g,h) ∈ P with g ≡ a.
Proof. Suppose (c,d) is an exemption according to 〈G, P 〉 and that c ≡ a. Then (c,¬d) ∈ out(G) \ out(G) − (g,¬h) for some
(g,h) ∈ P with g ≡ c. It follows that (c,¬d) /∈ H for some H ∈ out(G) ⊥ (g,¬h), whence (g,¬h) ∈ out(H ∪ {(c,¬d)}) by
the maximality of H so (a,¬d → ¬h) ∈ H ⊆ out(G), by Lemma 3.3, SI and the assumption that a ≡ c ≡ g . Hence, since by
assumption (a,¬b → ¬d) ∈ out(G), we have (a,¬b → ¬h) ∈ out(G) by AND and WO. Since (g,h) ∈ P and g ≡ a therefore,
the proof is complete. 
Taken together with Theorems 5.21 and 5.23 this gives us a way to represent exemptions that does not appeal to
derogation at all:
Theorem 5.27. (a,b) is an exemption according to 〈G, P 〉 iff (a,¬b) ∈ out(G) and (a,¬b → ¬d) ∈ out(G) for some (c,d) ∈ P with
c ≡ a.
Proof. For the left-to-right direction, suppose (a,b) is an exemption in 〈G, P 〉. Then (a,¬b) ∈ out(G). By Theorem 5.21,
(a,b) is antithetically permitted according to the same code. That is, (a,¬b → ¬c) ∈ out(G) for some exemption or explicit
permission (a, c). Hence, by Theorem 5.26, it follows that (a,¬b → d) ∈ out(G) for some (a,d) ∈ P , as desired. For the
converse direction, suppose (a,¬b) ∈ out(G) and (a,¬b → ¬d) ∈ out(G) for some (a,d) ∈ P . Then (a,b) is antithetically
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are done. 
This in turn yields a uniform procedure for calculating exemptions and antithetic permissions (explicit permission being
immediately given by P , of course). To check whether (a,b) is an exemption according to 〈G, P 〉 do:
If (a, -b) in out(G):
For c in P(a):





To check whether (a,b) is antithetically permitted, on the other hand, it suﬃces, by Theorems 5.18 and 5.19, to check
whether it is exempted if added to the code G . Of course this means that the initial membership test is superﬂuous, so the
procedure is simply:
For c in P(a):
If (a, -b -> -c) in out(G U (a, -b)):
return 1
return 0
6. Summary and conclusion
I have proposed a new analysis of the concept of positive permission, understood as that which is implied by a set of
explicitly pronounced permissions. Positive permission has been analysed as constraints on the generation of output from
a code. As such they naturally assume priority over the mandatory norms they override, which in turn take priority over
negatively permitted actions. This is all in conformity with the desiderata presented in Section 2.
The analysis shows that there is a close relationship between explicit permission and exemptions. Exemptions are anti-
thetically permitted, and antithetic permissions are exemptions in a larger code. Moreover, exemptions are characterisable
as the set of antithetic permissions whose local negations are included in the code. As regards the concept of negative
permission, it is more loosely coupled with the other two than most other accounts will have it. Antithetic permissions are
negative permissions if they are not also exemptions. But exemptions, on the other hand, are never negative permissions,
that is, the class of negative permissions and the class of exemptions are disjoint. I have argued that this is as it should
be, since it allows us to distinguish between, on the one hand, those actions that a legislature can prohibit at its discretion,
and those that are protected by a permissive provision, on the other. In other words, the disjointness of these two classes
of actions reﬂects their relative positions in the priority ordering of normative concepts.
Let EX(G, P ) be the set of exemptions in 〈G, P 〉, and let ANT(G, P ) and NEG(G) be the set of antithetic permissions
and negative permissions respectively. For any set of norms S , let S ′ := {(a,¬b): (a,b) ∈ S}. The result of the preceding
investigations may then be summarised as follows:
1. EX(G, P )′ ⊆ out(G).
2. ANT(G, P ) \ EX(G, P ) ⊆ NEG(G).
3. EX(G, P ) ⊆ ANT(G, P ).
4. P ⊆ ANT(G, P ) for any G .
5. ANT(G, P ) ∩ out(G)′ ⊆ EX(G, P ).
6. EX(G, P ) ∩ NEG(G, P ) = ∅.
7. ANT(G, P ) ⊆ EX(G ∪ ANT(G, P ), P ).
1 follows immediately from the deﬁnition of exemptions, 2 is Theorem 5.25, 3 is Theorem 5.22, 4 is Theorem 5.21, 5 is
Theorem 5.23, 6 is Theorem 5.24 and 7 is Theorem 5.18.
None of the results I have presented are diﬃcult, and the theory that emerges is simple. I consider this one of its
principal virtues.
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